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Abstract— Telecommunication regulators are facing 
increasing pressure to make spectrum resources more widely 
available to new wireless services and providers. In spectrum 
trading markets, buyers and sellers determine the assignments of 
spectrum and, possibly, its uses.  These markets are being 
considered or implemented by the regulatory bodies of many 
countries as a way to provide increasing efficiency in the use of 
spectrum and attend the demand for this resource. This work 
describes a classification for the implementation of spectrum 
trading markets and a way to model them and identify the 
conditions for their viability. Specifically, we make use of Agent-
Based Computational Economics (ACE) to model the 
participants in these markets, analyze the behaviors that emerge 
from the interactions of its participants and determine the 
conditions for viable markets. Our results, provide guidelines 
that can be used by regulators and wireless service providers for 
the design and implementation of these markets. 
 
 
Index Terms— Spectrum trading, secondary spectrum 
markets, agent-based computational economics, dynamic 
spectrum assignment, spectrum management. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE radio frequency spectrum is a highly regulated 
resource whose management is usually deferred to a 
government agency in most countries. The tasks related to 
spectrum management encompass all the activities related to 
regulating this resource including spectrum allocation and 
assignment of spectrum as well as regulation enforcement 
activities.  For our purposes, spectrum allocation refers to 
defining acceptable uses of certain bands (e.g. FM radio) 
whereas; spectrum assignment is the process of granting rights 
to particular users in a band that has been allocated (e.g. a 
radio station). 
Currently, most of the spectrum is used sub-optimally most 
of the time with low average occupancy values (less than 6% 
as reported in [1]). A main cause for this is that traditional 
spectrum allocation and assignment mechanisms have focused 
on avoiding interference between users and on the type of use 
given to spectrum rather than on the efficient use of spectrum 
and the maximization of economic benefits. In addition to 
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seeking mechanisms that improve spectrum efficiency, the 
tasks related to managing spectrum have become increasingly 
difficult for regulatory agencies due to the new technologies 
and uses for spectrum that are continuously emerging and that 
place increasing demands on this resource.  
In order to address these issues, flexible spectrum 
assignment mechanisms have to be put in place to adjust to the 
evolving wireless landscape while still achieving the best 
usage of spectrum possible under economic or social welfare 
considerations. In particular, market based mechanisms are 
being used by many spectrum management agencies in order 
to reduce their emphasis on command and control methods. 
Spectrum trading (ST) is a market based mechanism where 
buyers and sellers determine the assignments of spectrum and, 
possibly, its uses.  Trading transactions are initiated 
voluntarily by a spectrum holder and the sums paid by the new 
owner of the spectrum usage right are retained (in full or in 
part) by the previous owner [2]. ST provides a mechanism for 
regulators to address the allocation and assignment aspects of 
spectrum use. It is also a mechanism of interest to wireless 
service providers since ST can help them in: 
• Providing new revenue generating services 
• Serving geographical regions where spectrum 
resources are needed 
• Having mechanisms to handle peak loads of traffic 
• Being able to provide wireless services without big 
initial investments on infrastructure and spectrum 
licenses such as in the case of Mobile Virtual 
Network Operators (MVNO). 
• Obtain economic gains from spectrum that is unused 
(i.e. speculation) 
For economically-driven spectrum assignment to be 
optimally effective, a secondary market must exist that allows 
spectrum users to optimally choose between capital 
investment and spectrum use on a continuous basis, not just at 
the time of initial assignment [3]. We use Agent-Based 
Computational Economics (ACE) to analyze these markets 
and the behaviors of their participants which would be 
difficult to realize with conventional statistical and analytical 
tools due to the range of scenario parameters that can be 
changed [4],[5]. ACE has been previously used to study 
secondary spectrum use in [6]. A Spectrum Trading market 
modeling tool (SPECTRAD) has been developed as part of 
our research work and makes use of ACE methods and 
concepts [7]. With this tool, we model the participants in a ST 
market over a set of different scenarios. Our objective was to 
Characterization and Modeling of Spectrum 
Trading Markets 
Carlos E. Caicedo, Member, IEEE, Martin B. H. Weiss 
T 
 2 
find the conditions that lead to viable ST markets based on 
their liquidity and sustainability characteristics. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the 
entities that participate in a ST market. Section III provides a 
classification for exchange based ST markets. Section IV 
describes how we modeled ST markets and the behaviors of 
the different agents considered in our modeling. Section V 
describes the results obtained from the modeled scenarios. 
Section  VI  provides conclusions and recommendations based 
on the results of this work. 
 
II. PARTICIPANTS IN A SPECTRUM TRADING MARKET 
In [3] we classified the market structures that support ST. 
This classification considered two main types of market 
structures for spectrum trading: over-the-counter markets and 
exchange-based market operation. We will focus on the 
exchange-based markets as they offer a richer set of market 
behaviors.  The entities that that participate in these markets 
are described below. 
Spectrum license holders (SLH): Entity that owns a 
spectrum license and that offers it for trading in exchange of 
financial compensation. This entity can be a wireless service 
provider, a market maker, or a spectrum exchange which has 
been assigned a spectrum trading band by a regulatory agency. 
In general, SLHs hold spectrum for speculation or for their 
own use. 
Spectrum license requestors (SLR): Entity that submits bids 
for spectrum licenses to the ST market with the intent of 
acquiring the license. SLRs obtain spectrum for speculation or 
their own use. An entity that acts as a SLR can be: a wireless 
service provider, a market maker or a company/enterprise that 
acquires spectrum on behalf of another. 
Spectrum regulator: Government entity that oversees the 
ST market and defines the regulations for its operation. It is 
also responsible for providing and maintaining a spectrum 
availability and assignment database which is updated every 
time a spectrum trade is completed.  
Market makers: A market maker facilitates trading; it does 
not provide services with its inventory. It acts as a dealer that 
holds an inventory of spectrum and stands ready to trade when 
a SLR (buyer) or SLH (seller) desires. It gets revenue through 
the spread between the sell and buy prices for spectrum, and 
holds a spectrum inventory for negotiating and speculating. 
Spectrum exchange: An entity which provides and 
maintains a market place or facilities for bringing together 
buyers and sellers of spectrum in which spectrum trading 
transactions can take place. It also publicizes prices and 
anonymizes trading entities. 
 
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF SPECTRUM TRADING MARKETS 
A. Implementation architecture 
A spectrum trading market can be implemented in many 
ways. We have characterized the technical architectures for ST 
based in four dimensions (infrastructure, configuration 
method, activation and flexibility) described below [8].  
Infrastructure: Traded spectrum can be used by the buyer 
through a shared infrastructure (pooling point) where several 
market participants can make use of their awarded spectrum 
for transmissions. When infrastructure is not shared a licensee 
utilizes its own equipment to make use of his spectrum. 
Configuration method: Configuration of traded spectrum 
over a region can be done in a centralized or distributed 
manner. In a centralized architecture a central entity is in 
charge of configuring and controlling the infrastructure 
required for the use of spectrum. In a distributed architecture, 
the central entity gives permission over a specific area to a 
service provider to use the spectrum that has been traded 
which then configures its equipment.  
Activation: The requests to acquire spectrum can be 
provider initiated or user initiated. A provider initiated request 
is one where the entity that wants to provide a service initiates 
the request to obtain the necessary spectrum. A user initiated 
request is one where the user’s terminal equipment determines 
the need to acquire spectrum to support the services required 
by the user.  
Flexibility: Flexibility refers to the number of wireless 
standards that can be used to support services over the traded 
spectrum. When a set of a few wireless standards can be used, 
we refer to a multi-protocol architecture. When only one 
standard is allowed, we have a single standard architecture.  
Figure 1 summarizes the characterization of spectrum 
trading implementation architectures. 
B. Market structure 
We define a spectrum exchange as an organization made up 
of entities whether incorporated or unincorporated, that 
provide and maintain a marketplace or facilities for bringing 
together buyers and sellers of spectrum in which spectrum 
trading transactions can take place. For our purposes, we 
assume that spectrum exchanges make use of continuous 
double auctions as a mechanism to match buyers and sellers 
[9]. In general, an exchange denotes the idea of a central 
facility where buyers and sellers can transact. In the traditional 
sense, an exchange is usually involved in the delivery of the 
product. However, the devices required to make use of traded 
spectrum do not need to be co-located in the exchange so the 
exchange might not be involved in the active delivery of 
wireless services. 
In [3] we presented a characterization for exchange based 
ST markets based on their technical structure and market 
functionality. From the point of view of technical structure we 
considered that a spectrum exchange acts as a pooling point 
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(POOL) if its facilities house the equipment that enable the 
delivery of wireless services through spectrum acquired by a 
buyer in the exchange. In contrast, a non-pooling point 
exchange (NOPOOL) only delivers the authorization for use 
of spectrum to the buying party in a trade. The new SLH must 
then use this authorization to configure its devices to make use 
of the spectrum it has just acquired.  
From a functional perspective, a spectrum exchange can be 
a band manager (BM) for a given segment of spectrum over a 
region or have no band manager functionality (NOBM). An 
exchange acting as a band manager supports spectrum leasing 
transactions. A NOBM exchange will only facilitate the 
trading of spectrum among entities in the market without 
holding any spectrum inventory itself.  
Unless a basic amount of bandwidth has been defined as a 
spectrum trading unit, it will be very complicated to match 
bids and offers of spectrum without incurring in wasteful 
assignment of this resource. Although giving a particular 
structure to the way the spectrum trading band should be 
segmented will limit its operational flexibility, it also provides 
benefits in terms of simplifying the specifications to 
characterize a particular spectrum trade and managing 
interference between ST users.  
The proposed characterization generates four types of 
spectrum exchanges which can be used to implement a ST 
market. These are listed in table 1 as mentioned in [3]. By 
studying the trading, information overhead and infrastructure 
costs of different combinations of ST market implementation 
architectures with the set of ST exchange types and since we 
are interested in the running behavior (sustainability) of the 
market once its operating infrastructure has been put in place 
we find that the only differentiating factor between the 
different combinations was whether the exchange is organized 
to work as a band manager (BM) or not (NOBM) [7]. 
Thus, under the following assumptions/restrictions: 
• One wireless standard is being used in the market  
• Interference conditions do not impact the services 
provided over a unit of traded spectrum. 
• Trading takes place over an exchange entity. 
when modeling the running behavior ST markets, two types 
of market operation should be considered and clearly 
differentiated: Markets with a spectrum exchange organized to 
work as a band manager (BM) and markets with no band 
manager duties – a NOBM exchange.  
IV. AGENT BASED MODELING OF ST MARKETS 
We use Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to 
study the behaviors that emerge in ST markets from the 
interactions among market participants. Our objective is to 
determine the conditions that lead to viable spectrum trading 
markets, where viability is determined by the liquidity and 
sustainability of the market. When modeling markets, the 
agents representing market participants have limited (if any) 
knowledge of the decisions and state of other market 
participants (bounded rationality). Agents adapt their behavior 
based on their goals, their interaction with the market and/or 
other agents. Once initial conditions have been specified, the 
evolution of an ACE model is only dependent on the 
interactions among agents. 
A Spectrum Trading market modeling tool (SPECTRAD) 
has been developed as part of our research work and makes 
use of ACE concepts.  The tool works on top of the REPAST 
(Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit) platform 
developed by the Argonne National Laboratory for the 
development of agent based models [10,11]. The list of agents 
used in our models is shown in table 2. The different market 
scenarios studied in this work were generated by varying the 
market type, the number of market participants, the 
distribution of valuation levels for spectrum users and the 
amount of available spectrum in the market. 
A. General market setup and model assumptions 
We assume that spectrum trading will take place over a 
single geographic area over which the wireless services 
providers (modeled by Spectrum User agents) can provide 
services, have enough radio base stations (RBS) to cover the 
area and can trade spectrum with the help of a spectrum 
exchange. The spectrum users (SUs) can obtain resources to 
serve their traffic demands either by acquiring spectrum in the 
form of Basic Bandwidth Units (BBUs) or by using a unit of 
transmission of an Alternate Technology (AT). 
Investment in AT transmission units are generic and can 
resemble investing in equipment to make better use of 
TABLE I 
TYPES OF EXCHANGES 
Exchange type Characteristics 
POOL_BM 
(Pooling point + 
band manager 
functionality) 
 
- Use of traded spectrum is enabled 
and configured through equipment 
and/or infrastructure owned by the 
exchange. 
- All tradable spectrum returns to or 
is given by the exchange 
POOL_NOBM 
(Pooling point 
only, no band 
manager 
functionality) 
 
- Use of traded spectrum is enabled 
and configured through equipment 
and/or infrastructure owned by the 
exchange. 
- Different segments of spectrum can 
be activated and configured through 
the equipment/infrastructure of the 
exchange 
- No spectrum inventory is held by 
the exchange 
NOPOOL_BM 
(Non-pooling 
point + band 
manager 
functionality) 
 
- All tradable spectrum returns to or 
is given by the exchange 
- Exchange grants authorizations for 
use of spectrum (no equipment 
configuration is done by the 
exchange) 
NOPOOL_NOBM 
(Non-pooling 
point, no band 
manager 
functionality) 
 
- Exchange grants authorizations for 
use of spectrum (no equipment 
configuration is done by the 
exchange) 
- No spectrum inventory is held by 
the exchange 
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spectrum already owned by the SU or in wireline technology, 
thus avoiding the purchase of additional BBUs. The choice 
between BBUs or ATs will be based on the economic benefit 
that a given SU might receive from making a selection as it 
tries to minimize its costs for providing wireless service. In our 
models, each SU has a fixed price for its choice of AT unit 
that does not change during the life of the market. Thus, if a 
SU is acting as a SLR (i.e. buyer) when the market price for a 
BBU is higher than the AT unit price, the SU will buy ATs 
and when BBU prices are lower or equal to the AT price, the 
SU will buy BBUs. 
  In order to make the behavior of a scenario more realistic, 
once an AT unit is bought; it cannot be put into service 
immediately. We assume a one time tick delay (which can be 
mapped to an hour, a day, or a week depending on the time 
scale of choice) from the moment the AT unit is bought until it 
can be used. We also assume that the opportunity cost of not 
serving a traffic demand is too high for the SU to incur. Thus, 
a SU will buy BBUs at a price higher than its AT choice price 
in order to get the transmission resources to serve traffic 
requests until its AT units are usable (activated). After the ATs 
are activated, the SU will put back in the market (sell) the 
BBUs for which it “overpaid”. AT units have a finite lifetime, 
after which they become unusable. At this time, the SU must 
again decide whether to purchase spectrum BBUs or ATs. 
B. Spectrum User behavior 
For our analysis we model the aggregate traffic demand for 
each SU within the ST service area and the interval between 
changes of traffic demand with exponential distributions.  In 
this model, we assume that the traffic demands faced by SUs 
are independent. As the traffic to serve changes in time,  if a 
SU’s inventory of BBUs and AT units is more than enough to 
service the traffic, the SU can sell part of its spectrum 
inventory, thus becoming a SLH and prepare to post an offer 
to sell to the market. If the SU has less spectrum than that 
required to serve its customers, it will buy spectrum, thus 
becoming a SLR and prepare to post a bid to the market. 
 
1) SU behavior in a NOBM exchange based market 
In a NOBM exchange based market, each SU submits 
requests to buy or sell to the exchange. The exchange collects 
these requests and tries to find the best match between 
requests to establish a trade. SUs can query the spectrum 
exchange for its current market quote, which contains the 
minimum ask (minAsk) and the maximum bid (maxBid) price 
posted in the market. SUs use this information in their market 
decisions (price setting). Additionally, a SU can post limit 
orders to buy/sell or market orders to buy/sell. Market orders 
are buy/sell orders that should be filled at the best price 
currently available in the market (the market quote price). A 
limit order specifies to the exchange the desire of the SU to 
acquire/sell BBUs at the best price possible but in no event 
pay more than or sell for less than a specified limit price when 
buying or selling spectrum, respectively. 
 
2) SU behavior in a BM exchange based market 
In a market with a BM exchange, the SUs post bids for 
spectrum and, depending on the amount of spectrum in the 
exchange’s band and the amount of spectrum required by all 
the SUs, the exchange determines a cutoff price. A SU with a 
bid above the cutoff price gets assigned spectrum via a 
spectrum lease for a time period Tlease  after which it must 
submit a new bid if it wants the spectrum again. Each bid for 
spectrum is for a number of BBUs that allows the SU to serve 
its traffic demand. The bid price is selected to be below the 
SU’s alternate technology (AT) price. If the bid price is too 
low and the SU does not make the cutoff price announced by 
the BM exchange, the SU recalculates its bidding price and 
announces a new bid price in the next bidding round. After the 
BM announces the end of the bidding rounds, if a SU did not 
get any or all of the BBUs it needed, it will buy AT 
transmission units which will become active after an 
activation delay (usually 1 time tick). Over the course of the 
activation delay, the SUs that did not get spectrum will not be 
able to satisfy their traffic requirements. 
C. Exchange behavior  
1) NOBM exchange 
 In NOBM exchange based market scenarios, the market 
initialization is done via a call market trading session (all 
trades take place when the market is “called”) after which a 
continuous order-driven market is started. In the call market 
session, the SU agents engage in a series of mock auctions 
(several rounds of posts of bids and asks with no actual 
trading) to reach stable initial trading prices following a 
procedure similar to that in [12]. Once the prices have 
stabilized and been posted in the market, the bids and asks that 
are marketable are matched and a trade takes place. After the 
initialization phase, the SU agents may trade at anytime they 
choose by posting either limit orders or market orders. After 
each post, the exchange updates its order book and if a trade 
can take place, it transfers the spectrum license from the seller 
(SLH) to the buyer (SLR) and records the details of the trading 
TABLE II 
AGENTS IN ACE MODEL 
Agent Comments 
Spectrum User 
 
This agent models a wireless service 
provider that participates in the ST 
market as a seller of spectrum (SLH) or 
buyer (SLR)  
Market Maker 
Entity that provides liquidity to the 
market. It will be present only in 
scenarios in which the exchange does 
not act as a band manager (NOBM 
scenarios) 
Spectrum 
Exchange 
Centralized entity that gathers and 
matches bids and asks for spectrum. It 
will act as a band manager in BM 
scenarios and not in this capacity in 
NOBM scenarios 
Spectrum 
Regulator 
Manages a spectrum availability and 
assignment database.  
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transaction. It also informs the Regulator agent about the trade 
so that it can keep track of who is the owner of each BBU in 
the market.  
After each update to the order book, the exchange 
announces the market quote informing market participants of 
the current market ask price (best price at which spectrum is 
being sold) and the current market bid price (price of the best 
offer to buy spectrum). This way, market participants can 
adapt their price behavior to make competitive bids or asks in 
the future. Figure 2 shows the general behavior of a NOBM 
exchange. 
 
2)  BM exchange 
An exchange with band manager functionality will lease the 
BBUs in its managed band to SUs during tlease time periods. 
After the leasing period ends, all SUs must submit a new set of 
bids in order to have spectrum assigned to them. The exchange 
seeks to maximize spectrum efficiency, that is, it seeks to 
assign as much of the spectrum from its band as it can and to 
the users that value it the most. Thus, when it receives the bids 
for spectrum it will organize the bids according to price, if 
spectrum demand is greater than the amount of spectrum in 
the band, the cutoff price will be that of the bid with which the 
band manager gets to assign all the spectrum. Several bidding 
rounds are conducted until the cutoff price variation is less 
than 1% from one round to another or until a maximum 
number of bidding rounds is reached. All SUs with bid prices 
greater than or equal to the final cutoff price get assigned their 
requested BBUs and pay the exchange the cutoff price for 
each BBU. If spectrum demand is less than the amount of 
spectrum in the band, the cutoff price becomes the minimum 
cutoff price (PminCutoff) for sustainable operation of the band 
manager and all SUs that posted bids get assigned their 
requested BBUs and pay PminCutoff  for each of them. Figure 3 
illustrates the behavior of a BM exchange. 
D. Market maker behavior 
The market maker provides liquidity to the market and 
corrects market imbalances.  Following [13], we considered a 
reactive market maker that only intervenes when there are no 
entities in the buying side or on the selling side of the market 
with the objective of keeping the market alive and more liquid.  
The market maker (MM) has an initial inventory of BBUs 
assigned to it, and it uses that inventory to ensure that a bid-
ask spread exists at all times in the market. When its inventory 
is exhausted, it stops making the market.  When the market 
maker cannot act in the market, there will be unattended traffic 
capacity for at least one SU in the market. When market 
intervention by the MM is not required after Tno_mm 
 
 
Fig 2. NOBM exchange behavior 
 
 
Fig 3. BM exchange behavior 
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consecutive time periods, the MM will issue a bid or ask with 
the objective of getting its spectrum inventory back to its 
reference level which is the same as its initial spectrum 
inventory amount. 
E. Regulator agent 
 A regulator agent models a regulator entity and oversees 
the trades being conducted in the market and updates a 
spectrum assignment database so that ownership of a given 
BBU could be verified if needed. In the scenarios considered 
in this research, we assume a liberalized spectrum 
environment (spectrum can be given any use and owned by 
any SU) thus the regulator does not restrict any trading 
interaction.   
Further details on the behavior of these agents and their 
implementation in the SPECTRAD tool developed for this 
work are available in [7]. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
We make use of SPECTRAD and the agent behaviors 
specified in Section IV to simulate several market scenarios 
and determine the conditions for viable spectrum trading 
markets. Different market scenarios were simulated by 
varying the values of the amount of tradable spectrum in the 
market (S), the number of spectrum users present in the market (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛), the type of market exchange used (NOBM or BM) 
and the distribution of spectrum users’ valuations of spectrum 
(users with low valuations can only pay low prices for 
spectrum,  those with high valuations can pay higher prices). 
The variation of the amount of tradable spectrum (in BBU) 
and number of spectrum users are related in such a way that 
the value of the BBUs per SU ratio (R) is in the set [5, 10, 15, 
20, 25]. For all scenarios, when R is equal to 10, on average 
every spectrum user has enough spectrum to serve its average 
traffic requirement value. Thus lower values of R indicate an 
under-supply of spectrum, while higher values would lead to 
an over-supply of this resource to attend the average traffic 
needs of a SU. 
Table 3 lists the characteristics of the full-factorial 
experimental design for the market scenarios that were 
simulated. 100 runs for each scenario were performed in order 
to get statistically meaningful data. Each run was executed for 
5000 time ticks of which 3000 were used for the warmup 
period. Data was collected on the last 2000 time ticks. 
A. Results for NOBM scenarios 
In order to determine the viable NOBM markets, we 
developed decision criteria to classify the behavior of a 
particular factor in a market as desirable/acceptable (positive) 
or undesirable/unacceptable (negative). Additionally, in order 
to keep track of the aggregate behavior characteristics of a 
market we associated a score value to each factor.  It is 
positive when the market complies with the desired behavior 
characteristic or negative when it complies with the 
undesirable behavior. Based on the total scores for a market’s 
characteristics, a final list of viable markets was determined. 
Most of the threshold values that determine whether a 
market’s factor value should be considered acceptable or 
unacceptable were derived from the simulation data. Table 4 
summarizes the criteria to be used to evaluate and give scores 
to the different NOBM scenarios studied in this work. Factors 
such as the percentage of completed market runs were given 
more weight than other factors given their relative importance 
in the determination of viability characteristics (sustainability 
in this case). 
The scores for the simulated scenarios based on the viability 
criteria are summarized in figure 4. Only scores for user 
valuation distribution 1 are shown since the scores for the 
scenarios with other distributions are very similar. The NOBM 
markets that can be considered viable are those with scores 
TABLE III 
PARAMETERS FOR MODELED MARKET SCENARIOS 
Parameter Values 
Number of spectrum 
users (numSU) 
 
4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50 
(For NOBM scenarios, this number 
includes one market maker) 
Distribution of  
spectrum users’ 
valuation level (L) 
The table indicates 
proportion of 
spectrum users at a 
given valuation 
level 
User 
Dist 
Low Med. High 
1 ⅓ ⅓ ⅓ 
2 ½ ¼ ¼ 
3 ¼ ¼ ½ 
 
Available Spectrum  
(S) Values indicate 
the number of 
BBUs available for 
trading 
5*numSU, 10*numSU, 15*numSU, 
20*numSU, 25*numSU.  
The amounts of spectrum where 
chosen for each value of numSU in 
order to have  
R=� 𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
� in the set [5, 10, 15, 20, 
25] 
Spectrum exchange 
architecture 
The spectrum exchange can act either 
as a band manager (BM) or have no 
band manager functionality (NOBM) 
 
TABLE IV 
CRITERIA FOR NOBM SCENARIO EVALUATION 
ID Factor Pass (P) 
Fail 
(F) 
Score 
P/F 
C1 Percentage of completed market runs ≥70% ≤50% 2/-2 
C2 
Relative bid-ask spread 
(this is an indicator of 
liquidity in the market [9]) 
≤20% ≥50% 1/-1 
C3 
Mid-point BBU price 
(price at the mid-point 
between minAsk and 
maxBid) 
≥100 ≤25 1/-1 
C4 
Relative difference of the 
MM’s inventory to its 
reference level 
≤25% ≥100% 1/-1 
C5 Percentage of spectrum being offered for sale N/A ≥38% 0/-1 
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greater than 0. Scenarios with this condition meet several of 
the desirable conditions for a viable market. Additionally there 
is a gap in the score values with many scenarios with scores 
less than or equal to 0 and others with scores greater than or 
equal to 2. Based on the scores, we can say that most of the 
viable market scenarios are those that have R values that meet 
the condition   5 ≤ 𝑹𝑹 ≤ 10 and a number of spectrum users 
(numSU) such that 6 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 50. When R=15, the viable 
scenarios are those with 10 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 20. 
A value of R=5 indicates scenarios where on average there 
is 50% less spectrum per SU to serve the SU’s average traffic 
requirement. A value of R=10 is the “reference” value where 
the amount of spectrum per user is very close to being enough 
to serve a SU’s average traffic requirement and is where most 
of the viable scenarios are found.  When R=15, there is a 50% 
oversupply of spectrum and in this case, the viable markets are 
those with 10 to 20 spectrum users. Thus, if there is little or no 
oversupply of spectrum and with a number of spectrum users 
greater than or equal to 6, most NOBM spectrum trading 
markets will be viable. 
B. Results for BM scenarios 
This section displays the results from the BM market 
scenarios modeled using SPECTRAD. The behavior of the 
market scenarios for each of the previously mentioned factors 
will be shown based on the number of SUs for each scenario, 
the user distribution and the R value.  In a similar manner to 
the development of viability criteria for NOBM markets, we 
developed decision criteria and a scoring scheme to determine 
the viability of BM markets. Most of the threshold values that 
determine whether market factor values should be considered 
acceptable or unacceptable were derived from the simulation 
data. Table 5 summarizes the criteria to be used to evaluate 
and give scores to the different BM scenarios studied in this 
work. 
Using the viability criteria, the scores for the simulated 
scenarios are summarized in figure 5.The viable BM markets 
can be considered those with scores greater or than 0 since 
these scenarios do not meet many of the undesirable criteria, 
additionally all viable scenarios have a percentage of assigned 
spectrum > 62%.  
  The largest grouping of viable scenarios satisfy the 
conditions that 5 ≤ 𝑹𝑹 ≤ 10 and have a number of users such 
that 10 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 50. Other viable scenarios are found for 
the cases where R=10 and 5 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 10 and when R=15 
and 10 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 20, irrespective of user distribution. 
Using the value of R as a grouping variable, we can also say 
that R=10 generates has the greatest number of viable markets. 
Viability is met when 5 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 50. 
Thus a well balanced amount of spectrum in the market 
(enough spectrum to meet the average traffic demands of the 
SUs) produces viable markets in BM scenarios. 
C. Viability implications from NOBM and BM scenarios 
From the viability conditions identified for NOBM and BM 
scenarios we can make the following observations: 
Number of market participants for NOBM scenarios: 
NOBM scenarios require more than 6 market participants 
(SUs) and no excessive spectrum oversupply in order to be 
 
Fig. 4. Scores for NOBM market scenarios 
 
 
TABLE V 
CRITERIA FOR BM SCENARIO EVALUATION 
ID Factor 
Pass 
(P) 
Fail 
(F) 
Score 
P/F 
C1 Probability of empty bid list = 0 > 0 1/-1 
C2 
Probability that 
demand is greater 
than supply 
≥10% < 1% 1/-1 
C3 Average cutoff price N/A < 51 0/-1 
C4 Percentage of assigned spectrum  ≥62% ≤62% 1/-1 
C5 Average number of AT’s per SU N/A ≥10 0/-1 
 
 
Fig 5. Scores for BM market scenarios 
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viable. Regulators that want to implement ST markets should 
be aware of this critical level of required market participation. 
As the barriers to obtain spectrum are lowered, it should be 
expected that new wireless services providers will appear and 
become potential participants in ST markets. Thus having 
more than 6 SUs in a given geographic area could be feasible. 
Characteristics of the market maker: When defining the 
rules for the operation of market makers, regulators should 
understand that even simple market makers can provide 
adequate liquidity in a ST market. Since a market maker does 
not make use of its spectrum holdings to provide 
communication services, assigning too much inventory to a 
market maker would decrease spectrum efficiency. However, 
the greater the inventory level of the market maker the better 
prepared it would be to intervene in the market if there is a 
lack of spectrum offerings. Thus regulators should carefully 
define rules to determine the spectrum holdings of a market 
maker and balance market viability vs. spectrum efficiency.  
Viability in BM scenarios: BM spectrum trading markets 
are viable under the criteria used in this work for markets with 
a range of market participants (spectrum users) with a low 
limit of 5 and a high limit of 50 when R=10 which is the value 
of R at which there is no spectrum oversupply or undersupply. 
Thus a well balanced amount of spectrum in the market 
(enough spectrum to meet the average traffic demands of the 
SUs) produces viable markets in BM scenarios.  
Behavior trends are independent of user’s valuation 
distribution: Behavior trends for all markets analyzed are the 
same independently of the distribution of user’s valuation 
levels. There were very few exceptions where a deviation of 
the behavior for a particular parameter in a market was 
affected by the user distribution. For most cases, for the 
distributions used in this work, we can say that market 
behavior was not affected by them. 
Effect of spectrum oversupply: Oversupply of spectrum 
negatively affected all market scenarios considered. In 
particular R values greater than 20 generate unviable markets 
irrespective of market type (BM or NOBM). Thus, an 
oversupply of 100% above the level of spectrum that SUs 
need to serve their average traffic leads to unviable markets. 
Viability with no oversupply of spectrum: Spectrum trading 
is viable in markets with no oversupply (R=5 and R=10) for a 
wide range of spectrum user values. Thus, if enough market 
participants are present in a ST market and there is no 
oversupply of spectrum, the market can be viable. However, 
when the number of spectrum users (numSU) is less than 6, 
NOBM markets are unviable. When numSU is less than 10, 
BM markets are unviable except for R=10 where markets are 
unviable only when numSU is less than 5. 
Spectrum efficiency analysis: Figure 6, illustrates the 
spectrum efficiency for NOBM and BM scenarios. BM based 
markets achieve higher spectrum efficiency than NOBM 
markets for R ≤ 10, and similar efficiency for R=15. Since no 
viable markets where identified for R ≥ 20 in NOBM and BM 
scenarios a comparison for spectrum efficiency in those cases 
is irrelevant. Spectrum trading in the viable NOBM markets 
provided for spectrum efficiencies between 51% and 77% and 
for the viable BM cases, the efficiencies were between 78% 
and 93%.  These values are higher than the average spectrum 
occupancy values reported in studies of spectrum use 
efficiency such as [1]. These results show a positive 
characteristic of spectrum trading markets that is of great 
interest to regulators and spectrum users. 
Number of users in a viable ST market: Viable NOBM 
markets have a number of spectrum users in the range of 6 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 50, while for BM markets 10 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 50 
when 5 ≤ 𝑹𝑹 ≤ 10. For R=15, viability is present when10 ≤
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 20  for both market types and for BM cases 
viability is also present when 5 ≤ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 10 and R=10. 
The main difference between these values is that NOBM 
markets can support spectrum undersupply conditions better 
than BM markets. In general, BM markets are more sensible 
to spectrum oversupply and undersupply conditions than 
NOBM markets. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Spectrum trading can be used to move the current wireless 
market structure to support further flexibility in spectrum 
allocation and assignment. Our results can help policy makers 
and wireless service providers (future and current) to 
understand the required conditions for implementing spectrum 
trading markets so that they are economically viable. 
We have shown that these markets can be viable in a service 
area if sufficient numbers of market participants exist and the 
amount of tradable spectrum is balanced to the demand. The 
dynamics of spectrum trading market could interest entities 
not traditionally involved in the use of spectrum resources to 
start making use of this resource. Thus, new types of 
 
Fig. 6. Spectrum efficiency for NOBM and BM scenarios 
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businesses could be developed around the easiness of getting 
spectrum which would increase the number of market 
participants enhancing the viability of such a market as long as 
the amount of spectrum available for trading does not lead to 
severe undersupply or oversupply conditions. In general, 
unless barriers to the acquisition of spectrum are lowered 
enough to obtain sufficient market participants (6 or more) in 
a service area spectrum trading will not be viable. 
Identifying an appropriate frequency band to promote 
spectrum trading or to facilitate the entry of new market 
participants will be a key challenge for regulators and 
researchers. Additionally, determining an adequate balance of 
tradable spectrum to demand will also be challenging and 
could be approached by developing useful (and observable) 
proxies that enable regulators to estimate how well markets 
are behaving.   
An important byproduct of our research is demonstrating 
how ACE can be applied to the study of telecommunication 
markets. The methods and tools we have employed can be 
extended to the study of other telecommunications markets or 
scenarios where policy and regulatory frameworks determine 
the limits of the adaptive behaviors of the participants in a 
market.  
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